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NOTES
Discharge of Corporate Indebtedness at Less
than Face Value under the Internal Revenue
Code
by Harvey Mahlig*
p RIOR TO 1939 whenever a corporation paid less than the face
amount of an obligation in full satisfaction thereof, taxable in-
come was realized to the extent of the difference.' There were
three exceptions to the rule: 2 if the debtor were insolvent both
before and after the transaction; 3 if the cancellation of indebted-
ness were a contribution to capital; 4 or if the cancellation
amounted to a gift by the creditor.5 These exceptions were ap-
plicable and allowable only to a limited extent and are not
pertinent to the usual problem of the average corporation.
Where a corporation could discharge all or a portion of its
indebtedness at less than face value the advantage of such action
had to be weighed with the disadvantage arising from the inclu-
sion of the savings in taxable income.6 The fact that indebtedness
could be purchased or retired at less than face amount is an indi-
cation that the corporation may not have too good a financial
* HARVEY MAHLIG received his B. B. A. from Miami University in 1936 and
his M. B. A. from Cleveland College of Western Reserve University in
1948. From 1946 to 1951 he was employed by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, his last position being that of Technical Advisor, Appellate Staff.
In 1951 he joined the tax department of the Cleveland office of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Accountants and Auditors. He is a Certified Public
Accountant (Ohio) and is a member of the Ohio Society of Certified Public
Accountants and the American Institute of Accountants.
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931).
'For a general discussion of the exceptions see Dunham, "How to Eliminate
the Tax on Debt Cancellation," 29 TAXES 127 (Feb. 1951).
' U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, 94, 101 Art. 22 (a) -14; U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, Sec. 19.22
(a) -14; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22 (a) -14.
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22 (a) -14. Such section provides in part:
"In general, if a shareholder in a corporation which is indebted to him
gratuitously forgives the debt, the transaction amounts to a contribution
to the capital of the corporation to the extent of the original debt."
'Helvering v. American Dental Company, 318 U. S. 322 (1943); but see
Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28 (1949), which casts serious doubt
on the validity of the American Dental Company case.
'Whether real income is earned by such a transaction may be subject to
some debate, but nevertheless taxable income is realized under the general
definition of taxable gross income. See Int. Rev. Code § 22 (a); United
States v. Kirby Lumber Co., supra, note 1.
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position. If, in addition to the amount required to acquire the
indebtedness, the corporation had to secure the cash to pay the
tax arising therefrom, the total cash requirement might very
well be more than could be conveniently acquired or made avail-
able. In such case the opportunity to retire indebtedness at a
discount would have to be foregone. Many such opportunities
were available to corporations in the thirties, but because of the
tax consequences the opportunities were not grasped.
Congress was urged to consider this problem and, as a result,
in 1939 paragraph (9) was added to Section 22 (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code.7 Therein it was provided that there should not
be included in the taxable income of a corporation the amount
of income attributable to the discharge of any indebtedness as
evidenced by a security, provided at the time of such discharge
the corporation was in an unsound financial condition. In order
to obtain the relief8 provided, the corporation had to consent to
a reduction in the basis of its assets.9
'Revenue Bill of 1939 § 215 (a).
"(9) INCOME FROM DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.-In the case of a corporation,
the amount of any income of the taxpayer attributable to the discharge,
within the taxable year, of any indebtedness of the taxpayer or for which
the taxpayer is liable evidenced by a security (as hereinafter in this para-
graph defined) if-
(A) it is established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, or
(B) it is certified to the Commissioner by any Federal agency authorized
to make loans on behalf of the United States to such corporation
or by any Federal agency authorized to exercise regulatory power
over such corporation,
that at the time of such discharge the taxpayer was in an unsound financial
condition, and if the taxpayer makes and files at the time of filing the
return, in such manner as the Commissioner, with the approval of the
Secretary, by regulations prescribes, its consent to the regulations pre-
scribed under section 113 (b) (3) then in effect. In such case the amount
of any income of the taxpayer attributable to any unamortized premiums(computed as of the first day of the taxable year in which such discharge
occurred) with respect to such indebtedness shall not be included in gross
income and the amount of the deduction attributable to any unamortized
discount (computed as of the first day of the taxable year in which such
discharge occurred) with respect to such indebtedness shall not be allowed
as a deduction. As used in this paragraph the term "security" means any
bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness,
issued by any corporation, in existence on June 1, 1939. This paragraph
shall not apply to any discharge occurring before the date of the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1939, or in a taxable year beginning after December
31, 1942."
' Primarily the relief consists of a deferment rather than reduction of tax,
although in certain cases the tax can be deferred indefinitely.
' The basis is to be reduced under regulations prescribed by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue. A reduction in basis results either in reduced
depreciation allowances or in increased gain or reduced loss on sale of the
assets. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, Sec. 19.113 (b) (3) promulgated by the
Commissioner provide the method and the manner by which the basis of
the assets is to be reduced.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss1/8
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The requirement that the corporation be in an unsound
financial condition in order to benefit from this provision was ob-
jectionable. Normally a corporation in an unsound financial con-
dition would have more pressing and immediate use for its cash
than to use it to retire indebtedness. Only in an unusual situation
would it appear that indebtedness could be retired under the
conditions of the new paragraph. Consequently, in 1942, Con-
gress eliminated the proviso relating to unsound financial condi-
tion and made the section applicable regardless of the corpora-
tion's financial condition. 10 The revision in 1942 also eliminated
the requirement that the indebtedness be in existence on June 1,
1939.11 Subsequent to 1942 the relief provided by Section 22
(b) (9) was available to all corporations and was applicable to
all indebtedness evidenced by a security. 12
The advantages of this relief provision were described in the
1939 Act to be available:
"If the taxpayer makes and files at the time of filing the return,
in such manner as the Commissioner, with the approval of the
Secretary, by regulations prescribes, its consent to the regula-
tions prescribed under Section 113 (b) (3) then in ef-
fect." 13
At first blush it would appear to be a simple matter to
arrive at a decision to make or not to make the election. The
mechanics are simple enough. The corporation merely has to
consent to the application of the regulations relating to basis re-
duction at the time of filing its return for the year in which the
indebtedness was discharged. But there are many problems to
be considered before an election can be made. A corporation
operating at a profit would have to consider the effect of the basis
reduction on the tax liability of future years, whether tax rates
were likely to rise or fall and if the basis reduction could be ap-
plied to non-depreciable property. 14 Generally these problems
10 Rev. Act of 1942, § 114 (a).
1 Ibid.
Note that "Security" was defined to be "any bond, debenture, note or
certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness." Supra, note 7.
'Int. Rev. Code § 22 (b) (9).
1 4Prior to the Revenue Act of 1951, the reduction in basis could be applied
to non-depreciable property in certain instances; thus the tax incidence of
the transaction could be almost indefinitely postponed. However, in the
Report of the Senate Finance Committee with respect to the Revenue Act
of 1951, the Committee stated that it understood the Commissioner would
revise the Regulations changing the order in which the reduction is to be
applied to depreciable and non-depreciable property so that "a reduction in
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1952
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can be answered with a minimum of effort and a decision can be
easily reached. A profitable corporation can estimate the tax
consequences without too much difficulty.
As to a corporation operating at a loss, however, it might ap-
pear that no tax benefit can be obtained from the exclusion of the
gain from the discharge of indebtedness for there would be no tax
liability in the first place. The exclusion would merely increase
the loss. Further, even though the corporation derived no tax
benefit, the basis of property still would have to be reduced, hav-
ing the effect of increasing income in future years. But such is
not the case. Even though operating at a loss the benefits of
Section 22 (b) (9) can be obtained by virtue of the loss carryover
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 15 The additional loss
created by excluding the gain from the discharge of indebtedness
at less than face value could be used to offset income in some sub-
sequent year, if there be income in a subsequent year. If the cor-
poration continues to operate at a loss, the election under the
section would not seem to be beneficial. Rather, it would seem
that the election would be detrimental because the basis reduc-
tion would result in a reduced loss or an increased gain on the
sale thereof.
Thus a dilemma is created. If a corporation, having a loss in
the year in which the discharge took place, elects to exclude the
gain, it may never obtain the tax benefits. If no election is made
the chance to obtain this relief is lost. Of course, if the corpora-
tion can make a reasonable estimate of its future operations there
may be no problem. But how many corporations operating at a
loss can estimate future earnings or losses with any reasonable
degree of certainty? In any event, it does not seem reasonable
to condition relief on guesswork.
In Denman Tire and Rubber Co. v. Comm.16 the petitioner
purchased some of its own bonds at 50% of face value in 1941.
Inasmuch as 1941 was a loss year, the required consent was not
filed with its return for that year. In 1943 Denman realized a
profit and in filing its return for that year, reduced this profit by
the amount of the 1941 loss. If the consent required by Section
the basis of non-depreciable property will be made only after the exhaustion
of depreciable property or property subject to cost depletion." See note 18,
infra.
" Int. Rev. Code § 122. At present losses of one year are first carried back
to the preceding year and the balance of the loss, if any, is carried over to
five subsequent years.
" 14 TC 706 (1950); af'd. 192 Fed. 2d. 261 (6th Cir. 1951).
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22 (b) (9) had been filed with its 1941 return, the loss available
for carryover to 1943 would have been larger. In order to gain
this benefit, an amended return for 1941 was filed excluding the
gain arising from the discharged debt, thus increasing the 1943
loss. A consent to basis reduction was filed with the amended
1941 return. Because the consent was not filed with the original
return, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied relief to the
petitioner. Both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the Commissioner.
The decision against the taxpayer corporation is in harmony
with the holding of the Supreme Court that an election exercis-
able in a first return cannot be made in an amended return.
17
Further, the Internal Revenue Code permits the exclusion from
income only "if the taxpayer makes and files at the time of filing
the return * * * its consent" 's to a reduction of basis. In addi-
tion, the report of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives states, "It is a condition upon the taxpayer's
receiving the privilege of excluding the amount of income at-
tributable to the discharge of indebtedness from gross income
that when filing its return it consents to the regulations, which
are in effect relating to adjustment of basis." 19
Thus the relief afforded by Congress to corporations in finan-
cial difficulties turns out to be a gamble. If a corporation operates
at a profit in a year in which a debt is discharged at less than face
value, Section 22 (b) (9) will provide relief. But if, as is more
likely, the corporation has a loss, it is forced to speculate on
whether future years will be profitable.
Apparently realizing the inequities in this situation, Congress,
in 1951, eliminated the words "if the taxpayer makes and files at
the time of filing the return, in such manner as the Commissioner,
with the approval of the Secretary, by regulations, prescribes,
its consent" and inserted in lieu thereof, "if the taxpayer, at such
time and in such manner as the Secretary by regulations pre-
scribes, makes and files its consent." 20
J. E. Riley Investment Co., 311 U. S. 55 (1940). The Court held that an
amended return filed after the expiration of the statutory period for filing
the original return was not a first return for the purpose of the election
with respect to percentage depletion.
1 Int. Rev. Code § 22 (b) (9).
"H. R. Rep. No. 855, 76 Cong. 1st Sess., 1939-2 CB 504. (Emphasis supplied.)
"Rev. Act of 1951, § 304 (a).
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The report of the Senate Committee on Finance explains the
change: 21
"Section 304 of your Committee's bill makes a technical amend-
ment to Section 22 (b) (9) to allow for greater flexibility as
to the time for filing the required consent to a reduction of
basis. Under the present law, the taxpayer must file its con-
sent with its return for the taxable year. The bill amends the
Section to provide that the consent shall be filed at such time
as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. Under this
amendment, the Department could continue to require that
the consent be filed with the return in the ordinary case, but
might make provision for filing of the consent at a later date in
appropriate hardship cases." (Emphasis supplied.)
As of the time of this writing, the Secretary of the Treasury
has not issued proposed regulations concerning the filing of the
consent under the changes made by the Revenue Act of 1951. It
will be interesting to see what the definition of "appropriate
hardship cases" will be. In view of the general principle that
relief provisions are to be liberally construed,2 2 a taxpayer should
not be required to fie the consent until such time as he can de-
termine whether it would be advantageous to file. In view of the
loss carryover provisions of the Internal Revenue Code it is
possible that a taxpayer might not be able to determine the tax
effect of such a consent for as many as five years.
Whether a five year delay in the filing of the consent will be
allowed remains to be seen. A consent filed after such a delay
would require changes in the net loss of each prior year due to
the change in the basis in the year the debt was discharged.2 3
Possibly the Secretary may determine that administrative dif-
ficulties would be out of proportion to the benefits if a five year
delay were to be allowed. On the other hand it would seem that a
corporation which suffered losses for five consecutive years would
be more of a "hardship case" than a corporation which suffered
losses in but one or two years.
While income tax laws need not be fair, equitable or reason-
able24 it would seem that where Congress provides relief for a
taxpayer, that taxpayer should be able to obtain such relief with-
'Sen. Fin. Com. Rep. No. 781, 82 Cong. 1st Sess., IRB 1951-24-13712.
"Mertens "Law of Federal Income Taxation," § 309, Note 2.
See Note 15, supra.
What justification, for example, existed for taxing gain (prior to 1952)
on the sale of a personal residence where the vendor immediately pur-
chased a new residence with the proceeds of the old?
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out becoming involved in a guessing contest concerning profits of
future years. It is hoped that the Secretary will be sympathetic
and not require that consents be filed until such time as the tax
effects of the discharge of indebtedness at less than face value can
be determined.
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